Mergers are the mechanisms that redraw the boundaries of the firm. In this paper, we relate incomplete contracts, upon which much of our understanding of firm boundaries is based, to empirical regularities in the market for mergers and acquisitions. We begin by empirically challenging...

We provide a model of investment into new ventures that demonstrates why some places, times and industries should be associated with a greater degree of experimentation by investors. Investors respond to financing risk ? a forecast of limited future funding ? by modifying their focus to finance...

We examine how investors' tolerance for failure impacts the types of projects they are willing to fund. We show that actions that reduce short term accountability and thus encourage agents to experiment more simultaneously reduce the level of experimentation financial backers are willing to...

This paper explores the venture capital (VC) market and extends the standard principal-agent problem between the investor and venture capitalist to show how it alters the interaction between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. The nature of the three way interaction results in a...

We find that VC-backed firms receiving their initial investment in hot markets are more likely to go bankrupt, but conditional on going public are valued higher on the day of their IPO, have more patents and have more citations to their patents. Our results suggest that VCs invest in riskier and...

This paper considers the ramifications of post-auction competition on bidding behavior under different bid announcement policies. In equilibrium, players attempt to signal information to their post-auction competitors through their bids. Thus, an auctioneer can take advantage of these attempts...

The fundamental uncertainty of new technologies at their earliest stages implies that it is virtually impossible to know the true potential of a venture without learning about its viability through a sequence of investments over time. We show how this process of experimentation can be...

Our paper demonstrates that while failure tolerance by investors may encourage potential entrepreneurs to innovate, financiers with investment strategies that tolerate early failure endogenously choose to fund less radical innovations. Failure tolerance as an equilibrium price that increases in...

We investigate the repercussions of credit market mistakes for a firm's borrowing and investment decisions. When credit ratings are relatively optimistic, we find evidence that firms take advantage of inaccuracies by issuing more debt, increasing leverage, rolling over more debt and lengthening...

We provide a model of investment into new ventures that demonstrates why some places, times and industries should be associated with a greater degree of experimentation by investors. Investors respond to financing risk ― a forecast of limited future funding ― by modifying their focus to...