The financial scandal surrounding the collapse of Enron caused erosion in the reputation of its auditor, Andersen, leading to concerns about Andersen’s ability to continue in existence and ultimately its demise. In this paper we investigate the timing of switch by former Andersen’s clients....

In this paper we provide evidence that independent director turnover is influenced by a series of economic factors. Directors, both independent and insider, are less likely to leave if they are paid well or if the firm has a director pension plan. They are also more likely to leave when the firm...

Prior research documents that gains from non-recurring transactions flow through to CEOs' compensation, but that losses from non-recurring transactions do not. This paper extends extant literature by exploring the determinants of this phenomenon. We provide evidence that the prior findings of...

We investigate the change in the value-relevance of earnings and book value information in the financial industry compared to other industries from 1970 to 2005. Prior literature provides mixed evidence as to whether value-relevance reduces over time. Using Ohlson’s model, we find increasing...

This paper presents evidence of favorable management of qualified pension plans with large proportion of highly compensated employees. Defined-benefit pension plans that are dominated by highly compensated employees tend to contribute beyond the minimum amount required under Internal Revenue...

In the past six years, the average number of industries (2-digit SIC) serviced by audit offices in the United States has grown by 20% and the number of industries where the office has specialization has fallen by 40% (Data Source: Audit Analytics). This suggests a trend away from specialization...

Following the findings from marketing and management literature on corporate reputation, we develop a new proxy to measure the audit office reputation and examine the impact of this measure on audit fees and audit quality. We argue that the presence of reputable clients and their tenure with the...

Regulators have frequently expressed concerns about corporate earnings management. Audit committees are expected to monitor managers' financial reporting, including attempts to manipulate earnings numbers. The extant literature has focused on managers'incentives to manipulate earnings numbers....

Financial scandals such as those surrounding the Enron-Andersen debacle provoke concerns that auditors lack independence when faced with influential clients, and are unwilling to respond to client risks by resigning. Unlike previous studies that examine whether client influence affects audit...

The so-called “revolving door” for employees moving from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to the accounting firms it regulates has received heightened scrutiny recently. Hendricks, Landsman, and Peña-Romera (HLP) (2019) document that large audit firms exhibit improved...