I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...

A mediator, with no prior information and no control over the market protocol, attempts to redesign the information structure in the market by running an information intermediation mechanism with transfers that first elicits information from an agent, and then discloses information to another...

The complex multi-criteria optimisation problems arising in Kidney Exchange Programmes have received considerable attention both in practice and in the scientific literature. Whereas theoretical advancements are well reviewed and synthesised, this is not the case for practice. We present a...

Recent scandals over the manipulation of LIBOR and foreign exchange benchmarks have spurred policy discussions of the appropriate design of financial benchmarks. We solve a version of the problem faced by a financial benchmark administrator. Acting as a mechanism designer, the benchmark...

We analyze the role of benchmarks in over-the-counter markets subject to search frictions. The publication of a benchmark can, under conditions, raise total social surplus by (i) increasing the volume of beneficial trade, (ii) reducing total search costs, and (iii) facilitating more efficient...

I study an auction model in which the auction is followed by bargaining between bidders. Bidders with multi-unit demand bid for an object and then bargain over additional units. In the presence of post-auction interaction between players, equilibrium bidding strategies are sensitive to the...

I introduce a class of algorithms called Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains (DACC). DACC algorithms generalize the DA algorithms of Gale and Shapley (1962) by allowing both sides of the market to make offers. The main result is a characterization of the set of stable matchings: A...

We propose an economic framework for determining priority rules for allocating a scarce supply of vaccines that gradually become available during a public health crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Agents differ in observable and unobservable characteristics, and the designer maximizes a...

We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. The optimal dual variable, interpreted as a price function on the state space, is shown to be a supergradient of the concave closure of the objective function at the prior belief. Strong duality holds when the objective function is...