This paper investigates the institutional reason underlying the change in the trajectory of economic growth in post-reform China, and argues that the trajectory of growth was much more normal during the period of 1978-89 than in the post-1989 era. In the former period, growth was largely induced...

Recent studies suggest that individual investors may have private information and their trading can be informative. Consistent with this observation, we find that stocks that are more heavily traded by individual investors have higher liquidity, after controlling for other determinants of...

We examine optimal information disclosure through Bayesian persuasion in a two-player contest. One contestant's valuation is commonly known and the other's is his private information. The contest organiser can precommit to a signal to in uence the uninformed contestant's belief about the...

In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...

This paper examines the optimal mechanism design problem when buyers have uncertain valuations. This uncertainty can only be resolved after the actual transactions take place and upon incurring significant post-purchase cost. We focus on two different settings regarding how the seller values a...

In this paper, we investigate how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two-round elimination contests. We establish that there exists no symmetric separating equilibrium under the full revelation rule and find that the non-existence result is very...

We study sourcing and pricing decisions of a firm with correlated suppliers and a price-dependent demand. With two suppliers, the insight -- cost is the order qualifier while reliability is the order winner -- derived in the literature for the case of exogenously determined price and independent...

We study an optimal information/mechanism design problem for selling an object to a number of privately informed bidders, in which the winning bidder competes with a third party under differentiated Cournot competition afterwards. We show how to decompose the problem into two sub-problems:...