We argue that managers strategically issue earnings warnings based on whether evidence exists to verify misstatements in their prior disclosures. Using securities class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2019 pertaining to forward-looking earnings disclosures, we find that earnings warnings are...

This study investigates how capital market investors assess CEO succession planning in the context of CEO turnover events. Conducting empirical tests using a manually collected sample of 676 CEO turnover cases, we find that CEO succession planning mitigates the negative association between CEO...

This study investigates how capital market investors assess CEO succession planning in the context of CEO turnover events. Conducting empirical tests using a manually collected sample of 676 CEO turnover cases, we find that CEO succession planning mitigates the negative association between CEO...

We examine whether outside directorships of chief executive officer/chief financial officer (CEO/CFO) and resulting network ties to auditors affect auditor selection decisions and subsequent audit quality. The network ties arise when the CEO/CFO of a firm (home firm) serves as an outside...

This study examines whether auditors' industry expertise is negatively associated with underpricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEO) and whether the association between auditors' industry expertise and SEO underpricing changes around the global financial crisis (GFC). Using a sample of 2,028...

We test predictions that managers issuing voluntary capex guidance learn from analyst feedbackand that this learning enhances investment efficiency and firm performance (Langberg andSivaramakrishnan, 2010). Our findings are consistent with these predictions. First, we find thatmanagers' capex...

Financial journalists have two countervailing incentives when reporting on a firm's quarterly earnings guidance. On the one hand, their explicit incentive to attract readership leads them to express discrepant views that deviate from the guidance news managers intend to deliver. We hypothesize...

We study the implications of a recent governance practice promoted by proxy advisors, namely an anti-pledging policy, which limits managers' ability to unwind their equity-based compensation. Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms, we find that CEOs' pay-for-performance sensitivity (i.e., delta) and...