In a model of interconnected conflicts on a network among multiple contestants, we compare the equilibrium effort profiles and payoffs under both two scenarios: uniform effort (UE) in which each contestant is restricted to exert the same effort across all the battles she participates, and...

We study a very general contest game in which players exert efforts in multiple battles. The conflict structure, which represents who participates in which battlefield, is arbitrary and can be represented by a hypergraph. We show, under mild conditions on the cost function and contest...

This paper offers a resolution to an extensively studied question in theoretical economics: which measure spaces are suitable for modeling many economic agents? We propose the condition of “nowhere equivalence” to characterize those measure spaces that can be effectively used to model the...

This paper examines optimal targeting and sequencing strategies in the setup proposed by Ballester et al. (2006). The setup features payoff externalities and strategic complementarity among players, who non-cooperatively determine their contributions. We first analyze a two-stage game in which...

We develop a network model of conflict in which players are involved in different battles. A negative shock in one locality affects the conflict in this locality but may also increase battles in path-connected localities depending on the location of the battle in the network and the strength of...

Two types of intervention are commonly implemented in networks: characteristic intervention which influences individuals' intrinsic incentives, and structural intervention which targets at the social links among individuals. In this paper we provide a general framework to evaluate the distinct...

Network-based targeting is valuable in many applications such as diffusion of new technology, product promotion in marketing, among others. Nevertheless, how to quantitatively measure the effectiveness of targeting strategies remains a challenge. This paper studies a class of network games with...

As a common practice, various firms initially make information and access to their products/services scarce within a social network; identifying influential players that facilitate information dissemination emerges as a pivotal step for their success. In this paper, we tackle this problem using...

In this paper, we consider a model with a monopoly firm who sells social goods sequentially to a group of customers in a network. We show that, with symmetric social interactions, the optimal pricing under arbitrary launch sequence is independent of customers' network positions, the launch...

We consider a network model where individuals exert efforts in two types of activities that are interdependent. These activities can be either substitutes or complements. We provide a full characterization of the Nash equilibrium of this game for any network structure. We show, in particular,...