Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Permissions -- Foreword -- Contributor -- An Appreciation -- Contributor -- 1. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. PNAS 36 (1950) 48-49. -- 2. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18 (1950) 155-162. -- 3. Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951)...

Consider a group of people confronted with a dichotomous choice (for example, a yes or no decision). Assume that we can characterize each person by a probability, p <Subscript>i</Subscript>, of making the ‘better’ of the two choices open to the group, such that we define ‘better’ in terms of some linear...</subscript>

We approach the problem of preference aggregation by endowing both individuals and coalitions with partially-ordered or incomplete preferences for decision under risk. Restricting attention to the case of complete individual preferences, and assuming complete preferences for some pairs of agents...