"Why is it difficult to restructure sovereign debt in a timely manner? In this paper we present a theory of the sovereign debt restructuring process in which delay arises as individual creditors hold-up a set- tlement in order to extract greater payments from the sovereign. We then use the...

We model a buyer who wishes to combine objects owned by two separate sellers in order to realize higher value. Sellers are able to avoid entering into negotiations with the buyer, so that the order in which they negotiate is endogenous. Holdout occurs if at least one of the sellers is not...

This paper reviews the lessons learned from the application of the tools of game theory to the theoretical study of sovereign debt and default. We focus on two main questions. First, we review answers to the most fundamental question in the theory of sovereign debt: given that there is no...

Tenders and traditional auctions are increasingly being used in regulation; as a consequence it is essential regulators have an understanding of the basics of auction theory. There is no simple prescription for the design of an auction or tender that will fit all situations; moreover, the costs...

Why is it difficult to restructure sovereign debt in a timely manner? In this paper, we present a theory of the sovereign debt-restructuring process in which delay arises as individual creditors hold up a settlement in order to extract greater payments from the sovereign. We then use the theory...

Recently, U.S. environmental law has shown a tendency toward increased lender liability. A model of a potentially judgment-proof owner of a firm, a lender, and a potential victim is developed in which this policy can increase accident frequency and reduce efficiency. Full, partial, and zero...