We introduce random evolving lotteries to study preference for non‐instrumental information. Each period, the agent enjoys a flow payoff from holding a lottery that will resolve at the terminal date. We provide a representation theorem for non‐separable risk consumption preferences and use...

We analyse preferences over finite decision problems in order to model decision-makers with "changing tastes". we provide conditions on these preferences that identify the Strotz model of consistent planning. building on an example given by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="R8">Peleg and Yaari (1973)</xref>, we show that for problems with...

We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Our theory permits issue preference; that is, agents may not be indifferent among gambles that yield the same probability distribution if they depend on...

This paper comments on "On the Potential of Neuroeconomics: A Critical (but Hopeful) Appraisal" by B. Douglas Beinheim (JEL D01, D87)

We provide a time consistent model that addresses the preference reversals that motivate the time inconsistency literature. The model subsumes the behavior generated by the time-inconsistency approach in finite settings but, unlike the time-inconsistent models, allows for self-control. This...

We study political compromise founded on tacit cooperation. Two political parties must share a fixed pie in each of an infinite sequence of periods. In each period, the party in power has ultimate authority to divide the pie. Power evolves according to a Markov process among a set of political...