We introduce random evolving lotteries to study preference for non‐instrumental information. Each period, the agent enjoys a flow payoff from holding a lottery that will resolve at the terminal date. We provide a representation theorem for non‐separable risk consumption preferences and use...

We analyse preferences over finite decision problems in order to model decision-makers with "changing tastes". we provide conditions on these preferences that identify the Strotz model of consistent planning. building on an example given by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="R8">Peleg and Yaari (1973)</xref>, we show that for problems with...

We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Our theory permits issue preference; that is, agents may not be indifferent among gambles that yield the same probability distribution if they depend on...

This paper comments on "On the Potential of Neuroeconomics: A Critical (but Hopeful) Appraisal" by B. Douglas Beinheim (JEL D01, D87)

We provide a time consistent model that addresses the preference reversals that motivate the time inconsistency literature. The model subsumes the behavior generated by the time-inconsistency approach in finite settings but, unlike the time-inconsistent models, allows for self-control. This...

We study political compromise founded on tacit cooperation. Two political parties must share a fixed pie in each of an infinite sequence of periods. In each period, the party in power has ultimate authority to divide the pie. Power evolves according to a Markov process among a set of political...

This paper presents a model in which agents choose an action and a time at which to take the action. The authors show that, when agents choose when to act, their decisions become clustered together, giving the appearance of an information cascade even though information is actually being used...

The authors provide conditions on an exchange economy with asymmetric information that guarantee that when the economy is replicated sufficiently often, there will be an allocation that is incentive compatible, individually rational, and nearly efficient. The main theorem covers both the case in...