In a random search environment with two racial groups each composed of identical numbers of high and low productivity workers, firms use an imperfect screening device (interviews) to control hiring. If inconclusive interviews lead firms to hire majority workers but not minority workers, then the...

This paper explores how interviews affect the matching process when worker productivity is private information. Wages are determined by a single round of strategic bargaining after the worker is interviewed. The implications of this hiring process for the efficiency of matching and the incidence...

This paper analyses a matching model of the marriage market with directed, on-the-job search. Everyone is born attractive but "matures" according to a Poisson process into unattractiveness. Marriages between equally attractive people are stable but mixed marriages are not. The implied patterns...

This article considers optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in an equilibrium matching framework where wages are determined by strategic bargaining. It compares the outcome with the standard Nash bargaining approach, which can be interpreted as union wage bargaining with an insider/outsider...