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Trade of a common value good

Williams, Steven R. - In: Review of economic design 27 (2023) 4, pp. 701-724

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014437490

Price discovery using a double auction

Satterthwaite, Mark Allen; Williams, Steven R.; … - In: Games and economic behavior 131 (2022), pp. 57-83

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013253301

Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a locally stable message process,

Williams, Steven R. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 35 (1985) 1, pp. 127-154

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005058399

Efficient performance in two agent bargaining

Williams, Steven R. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 41 (1987) 1, pp. 154-172

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005111991

Limited observability as a constraint in contract design

Krasa, Stefan; Williams, Steven R. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 134 (2007) 1, pp. 379-404

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005117537

On the local convergence of economic mechanisms

Saari, Donald G.; Williams, Steven R. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 40 (1986) 1, pp. 152-167

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153641

Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency

Satterthwaite, Mark A.; Williams, Steven R. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 48 (1989) 1, pp. 107-133

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153780

Ex Post Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction When Demand Can Be Arbitrarily Larger Than Supply

Zacharias, Eleftherios; Williams, Steven R. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 97 (2001) 1, pp. 175-190

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005160098

Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions

Satterthwaite, Mark A.; Williams, Steven R.; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 248-263

We consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers and m sellers. Traders privately know their values/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms are considered. The buyer's bid double auction collects bids and asks from traders and determines the allocation by selecting a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785202

Implementing a generic smooth function

Williams, Steven R. - In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 13 (1984) 3, pp. 273-288

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005216590