We present a lab experiment on an endogenous trust game in which one player (the principal) may decide to leave the investment choice to the agent or to take the investment decision himself/herself. In the latter case we refer to this as “voluntary leadership”. We show that voluntary...

The authors present a simple classroom experiment that can be used as a teaching device to introduce important concepts of organizational economics and incentive contracting. First, students take the role of a principal and design a contract that consists of a fixed payment and an incentive...

We study behavior within a simple principal-agent experiment. Our design allows for a large class of linear contracts. Principals can offer any feasible combination of (negative) fixed wages and incentives in the form of return sharing. This great contractual flexibility allows us to study...

Experimental literature has shown that social preferences influence how individuals bargain and make sharing decisions. It usually considers situations in which individuals negotiate on a single issue. This paper explores a different environment and reports on an experiment based on a...

The book reports experimental studies and a theoretical investigation of non-cooperative bargaining games with joint production. Such games have rarely been studied within laboratory experiments despite being more general and more natural than bargaining without production. It is shown that...