We study the consequences of franchise extension and ballot reform for the size of government in Western Europe between 1820 and 1913. We find that franchise extension exhibits a U-shaped association with revenue per capita and a positive association with spending per capita. Instrumental...

Martin Paldam is one of the most prominent figures of Danish economics and European public choice. In this introduction to the special issue, we identify five of the areas, where he has made significant contributions: (1) vote and popularity functions and political business cycles; (2)...

This paper suggests a new approach to analyzing the causes of franchise extension. Based on a new dataset, it provides a detailed econometric study of the Great Reform Act of 1832 in the United Kingdom. The analysis yields four main results. First, modernization theory receives limited support....

This paper develops a political-economy model to investigate to what extent a rise of environmentalism can successfully encourage higher pollution taxes and reduce pollution. The model focuses on special-interest group politics, intra-industry trade and a transnational environmental externality....

This paper considers trade policies in a small open economy in which two influential interest groups lobby the government. Since competitive lobbying leads to excessive rent-seeking expenditures, the lobbies have an incentive to cooperate. The outcome of cooperative lobbying is characterized in...

We study the role of political accountability as a determinant of corruption and economic growth. Our model identifies two governance regimes defined by the quality of political institutions and shows that the relationship between corruption and growth is regime specific. We use a threshold...