We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.

Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...

We prove existence and purification results for strategic environments possessing a product structure that includes classes of large games, stochastic games, and models of endogenous institutions. Applied to large games, the results yield existence of pure-strategy equilibria allowing for...

We develop an approach to providing epistemic conditions for admissible behavior in games. Instead of using lexicographic beliefs to capture infinitely less likely conjectures, we postulate that players use tie-breaking sets to help decide among strategies that are outcome-equivalent given their...

We extend Armstrong’s (1996) result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening models providing support for the view that the result holds true in a large class of models. We first relax some of the strong technical assumptions he imposed and provide alternative sufficient conditions for...