This article explores the determinants of effective leadership in a team of production. We obtain that for leadership to be effective, the leader must be at least as productive as the follower. In the case of a charismatic leader, we obtain that efficiency can be restored with a homogeneous team.

When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-effective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and active monitoring. This paper reports the results...

We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite...

This note explores the consequences of a player's freedom of choice over his degree of commitment for the bargaining outcome. In particular, we modify the nonstationary structure of Fershtman and Seidmann (1993)'s bargaining by allowing one player to possess imperfect commitments where the...

We construct a theoretical labor market that incorporates skill differences across workers to identify under which conditions temporary contracts are a way to access to permanency. Firing costs and unemployment benefits increase the threshold productivity above which workers access to permanency.