This article describes the sale and optimal regulation of a sequence of public utilities, where monitoring of regulatory compliance is costly. The government is concerned with the revenue raised by successive privatizations as well as the standard objective of efficiency in production. The costs...

In this paper we present a model of the behavior of commercial lobbying firms (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D.C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups, commercial lobbying firms represent a variety of clients and are not directly affected by policy...

type="main" <p>A model where a dictator decides on both the level of public-sector capital and whether to democratize is constructed. Under dictatorship the labour market is monopsonistic; democratization involves instituting a competitive labour market. Workers sometimes have a credible threat of...</p>

We show that industrial ownership structures, such as keiretsu groupings in Japan, may significantly impact firms' incentives to engage in FDI. While the previous literature has mainly focused on the cost of capital advantages enjoyed by keiretsu firms, this paper examines two relatively...