This paper analyzes how organizations can minimize the costs of processing and communicating information. Communication is costly because it takes time for an agent to absorb new information sent by others. Agents can reduce this time by specializing in the processing of particular types of...

This short paper surveys some recent research on the internal organization of firms, with an emphasis on task allocation and synchronization. It focuses on an organization facing no incentive problems but time constraints and costs of communication. It highlights two motives for communication:...

In their indisposed paper, Aswani, Raghunandan, and Rajgopal (ARR) provide a critique of our main findings on the pricing of carbon transition risk in Bolton and Kacperczyk (2021a, 2021b, 2022) and in Bolton, Halem, and Kacperczyk (2022). We take exception to the key elements of their critique....

The Economics of Contracts provides a guided tour to the leading ideas in contract theory. It assembles some of the foundational writings on contracting under limited and asymmetric information, incentives and mechanism design. It contains, in particular, the key contributions of five recent...