Showing 1 - 10 of 16
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371193
We study the problem of finding the profit-maximizing mechanism for a monopolistic provider of a single, non-excludable public good. Our model covers the most general setting, namely, we allow for correlation in the signal distribution as well as for informational externalities in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049766
This paper studies the sales of a single indivisible object where bidders have continuous valuations. In Grigorieva et al. [14] it was shown that, in this setting, query auctions necessarily allocate inefficiently in equilibrium. In this paper we propose a new sequential auction, called the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011052488
A digital mechanism is defined as an iterative procedure in which bidders select an action, from a finite set, in each iteration. When bidders have continuous valuations and make strategic reports, we show that any ex post implementation of the Vickrey choice rule via such a mechanism needs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065414
Lacking payment systems become a bottleneck for the vision of the Information Economy. In many cases, the payments of a fraction of a cent, the so-called micropayments, are of particular interest. In this paper we propose a framework to evaluate the payment systems. The framework consists of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005727139
The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005231311
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011885475
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011782301
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549340
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011825957