A class of stochastic games with additive reward and transition structure is studied. For zero-sum games under some ergodicity assumptions 1-equilibria are shown to exist. They correspond to so-called sensitive optimal policies in dynamic programming. For a class of nonzero-sum stochastic games...

The family of weighted Banzhaf values for cooperativen-person TU-games is studied. First we introduce the weighted Banzhaf value for an exogenously given vector of positive weights of the players. Then we give an axiomatic characterization of the class of all possible weighted Banzhaf values....

A class of stochastic games with additive reward and transition structure is studied. For zero-sum games under some ergodicity assumptions 1-equilibria are shown to exist. They correspond to so-called sensitive optimal policies in dynamic programming. For a class of nonzero-sum stochastic games...

In this paper we show that many results on equilibria in stochastic games arising from economic theory can be deduced from the theorem on the existence of a correlated equilibrium due to Nowak and Raghavan. Some new classes of nonzero-sum Borel state space discounted stochastic games having...

The model of dynamic social influence is used to describe the coordination of individual economic decisions. Computer simulations of the model show that the social and economic transitions occur as growing clusters of “new” in the sea of old. The model formulated at the individual level may...

The speed of social and technological changes is constantly increasing. Change is a pre-requisite for economic development but this increasing speed carries additional costs that may largely affect the ability of the social systems to adopt them. While the financial costs constitute a limit to...

The well-known model of altruistic growth/strategic bequest is studied. A stochastic transition function is considered and fairly general sufficient conditions for the existence of Markov-stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium are given. Also some special cases in which the equilibrium policy is...

We present a nonlinear ordinary differential equation model of the conflict between two actors, who could be individuals, groups, or nations. The state of each actor depends on its own state in isolation, its previous state in time, its inertia to change, and the positive feedback (cooperation)...