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We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy as an atomless probability distribution over that player's strategy set. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049724
Since the pioneering work of McFadden (1974), discrete choice random-utility models have become work horses in many areas in transportation analysis and economics. In these models, the random variables enter additively or multiplicatively and the noise distributions take a particular parametric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065527
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The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005737346
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Accordingto Hamilton’s(1964a, b) rule,a cost lyaction will be undertaken if its fitness cost to the actor falls short of the discounted benefit to the recipient,where the discount factor is Wright’s index of relatedness between the two. We propose a generalization of this rule,and show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008753105
We analyze how family ties affect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings. The siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty, and they may transfer output to each other. With equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008645042
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We consider a market for lemons in which the seller is a monopolistic price setter and the buyer receives a private noisy signal of the product’s quality. We model this as a game and analyze perfect Bayesian equilibrium prices, trading probabilities and gains of trade. In particular, we vary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752430