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Can productivity growth measures identify best performing hospitals? Evidence from the English National Health Service

Aragon, Maria Jose; Castelli, Adriana; Chalkley, Martin; … - In: Health Economics 28 (2019) 3, pp. 364-372

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012082399

Prospective payment systems and discretionary coding-Evidence from English mental health providers

Moscelli, Giuseppe; Jacobs, Rowena; Gutacker, Nils; … - In: Health Economics 28 (2018) 3, pp. 387-402

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012082402

Special issue title: the economics of the Middle East and North Africa

Cobham, David P. (ed.); Chalkley, Martin (ed.) - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012821354

Editorial of special issue "Industrial organisation of the health sector and public policy"

Chalkley, Martin; Cremer, Helmuth; Siciliani, Luigi - In: Journal of health economics 50 (2016), pp. 256-257

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011589093

First do no harm : the impact of financial incentives on dental X-rays

Chalkley, Martin; Listl, Stefan - In: Journal of health economics 58 (2018), pp. 1-9

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011999255

Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency

Chalkley, Martin; Khalil, Fahad - In: Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 6, pp. 1132-1153

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005204431

Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard

Chakraborty, Indranil; Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques - In: The RAND Journal of Economics 52 (2021) 1, pp. 179-206

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012536538

Use it or lose it

Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarrée, Jacques - In: Journal of Public Economic Theory 21 (2019) 6, pp. 991-1016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012094766

Contracts and Productive Information Gathering

Cremer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles - In: Games and Economic Behavior 25 (1998) 2, pp. 174-193

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413744

Contracts offered by bureaucrats

Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarrée, Jacques - In: RAND Journal of Economics 44 (2013) 4, pp. 686-711

type="main" <p>We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her...</p>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011034590