We study the role of transparency in an environment of robust monetary policy under wage bargaining. The standard view from the game-theoretical literature is that, with unionised labour markets, monetary policy transparency is unambiguously “bad” (it induces increases in wage and price...

Disclosure of monetary policy targets reduces unemployment uncertainty at the expense of higher inflation uncertainty, thereby posing a dilemma for monetary policymakers.

In a model with fiscal policy, Hughes Hallett et al. [Hughes Hallett, A., Libich, J., Stehlík, P., 2009. Rogoff revisited: the conservative central banker proposition under active fiscal policies. Economics Letters 104, 140–143] challenge the relevance of the conservative central banker...

Optimal delegation restores the beneficial effects of non-accommodating monetary policy when the central bank is allowed to be not fully transparent about its response to wages.

This paper characterises South Korean monetary policy in the period of explicit inflation targeting that started in 1999. We calculate Bank of Korea's parameters in the policy objective function, conditional on an estimated macro-model. We show that this central bank appears to have pursued...