Open market share repurchases are strictly regulated to prevent managers from taking advantage of selling shareholders. We examine compliance with these rules in France, where the mandatory disclosure of share repurchases provides detailed information on repurchases actually undertaken. Using a...

We examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms the freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards;...

This paper examines open market stock repurchases in France. We find a positive average market reaction to the repurchase announcement. However, the magnitude of the price reaction is found to depend on a number of corporate governance structure measures. The positive aspects of the announcement...

French law mandates that employees of publicly listed companies can elect two types of directors to represent employees. Privatized companies must reserve board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment, while employee-shareholders can elect a director whenever they hold at...