Dynamic exchange economies with uncertainty are considered where the information is released over infinite time. The strong sequential core of such an economy consists of those consumption streams that can be improved upon by no coalition at no moment of time. Non-emptiness of the strong...

We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining protocol, that is, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is the...

I consider n-person normal form games where the strategy set of each player is a non-empty compact convex subset of an Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous in joint strategies and continuously differentiable and concave in the player i's strategy. No further...

This note provides a new proof of the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core in a pure exchange economy with finitely many agents. The proof is based on the concept of <InlineEquation ID="Equ2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$(\Pi, \beta)$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-balanced core for games without side payments due to Bonnisseau and Iehlé (2003). Copyright Springer-Verlag...</equationsource></inlineequation>

We study a process of bargaining over alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. The paper focuses on the asymptotic behavior of the subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies as the continuation probability approaches one. We give a complete characterization of the limit...