We consider equilibrium timing decisions in a model with a large number of players and informational externalities. The players have private information about a common payoff parameter that determines the optimal time to invest. They learn from each other in real time by observing past...

We analyse information aggregation in a stopping game with uncertain pay-offs that are correlated across players. Players learn from their own private experiences as well as by observing the actions of other players. We give a full characterization of the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium,...

We analyze the optimal investment strategy of a firm that can complete a project either in one stage at a single freely chosen time point or in incremental steps at distinct time points. The presence of economies of scale gives rise to the following trade-off: lumpy investment has a lower total...

We analyse information aggregation in a stopping game with uncertain pay-offs that are correlated across players. Players learn from their own private experiences as well as by observing the actions of other players. We give a full characterization of the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium,...