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The influence relation was introduced by Isbell [Isbell, J.R., 1958. A class of simple games. Duke Math. J. 25, 423-439] to qualitatively compare the a priori influence of voters in a simple game, which by construction allows only "yes" and "no" votes. We extend this relation to voting games...
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This paper considers voting situations in which the vote takes place iteratively. If a coalition replaces the status quo a with a contestant b, then b becomes the new status quo, and the vote goes on until a candidate is reached that no winning coalition is willing to replace. It is well known...
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Voting power theories measure the ability of voters to influence the outcome of an election under a given voting rule. In general, each theory gives a different evaluation of power, raising the question of their appropriateness, and calling for the need to identify classes of rules for which...
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We study the stability of decision making in committees. A policy proposal introduced by a committee member is either adopted or abandoned in favor of a new proposal after deliberations. If a proposal is abandoned, it is in spite of the committee member who introduced it, who does not cooperate...
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