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Standard tax incidence analysis deals with households and firms that buy and sell consumption goods, as opposed to financial institutions that buy and sell financial products. This paper develops a framework that allows us to study tax incidence on financial markets, and applies it to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117649
This paper derives a version of the Samuelson rule which takes into account that a distortionary Ramsey-tax system is used to finance public-goods provision. Individuals have private information about their public-goods preferences. Moreover, individuals differ in their productive abilities. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010865752
This paper extends the model of optimal income taxation due to Mirrlees (Mirrlees, J., 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38, 175-208) and includes private information on public goods preferences. A mechanism design approach is used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005066557
We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008488427
Tax competition between two governments who choose nonlinear income tax schedules to maximize the average utility of their residents when skills are unobservable and labor is perfectly mobile is examined. We show that there are no equilibria in which there is a skill type that pays positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719483
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We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009743166
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354632
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