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We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set ofε‐coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (ε‐CCE) of the underlying one‐shot game. The value...
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We compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. With voluntary voting, all equilibria involve sincere voting and positive participation. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is...
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We study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single expert,...
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We study first- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting ineffi ciencies create a motive for post-auction trade which, in our model, takes place via monopoly pricing—the winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to...
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We study first-price auctions in a model with asymmetric, independent private values. Asymmetries lead to inefficient allocations, thereby creating a motive for resale after the auction is over. In our model, resale takes place via monopoly pricing--the winner of the auction makes a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008521755
Perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games may be vulnerable to the possibility of renegotiation among players. The authors study the limiting properties of the set of payoffs from equilibria that are immune to renegotiation. Their main result is th at the limit of the set of payoffs from...
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