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We develop a consistent nonparametric test of common values in first-price auctions and apply it to British Columbia Timber Sales data. The test is based on the behavior of the CDF of bids near the reserve price. We show that the curvature of the CDF is drastically different under private values...
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Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and incomplete information in which buyers and sellers' values for the traded good are private and independently drawn. Time is discrete, each period has length [delta], and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408738
We propose a quantile-based nonparametric approach to inference on the probability density function (PDF) of the private values in first-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values. Our method of inference is based on a fully nonparametric kernel-based estimator of the quantiles...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011052272
We provide a full dynamic analysis of a continuous-time variant of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) matching and bargaining model with unbalanced flows of buyers and sellers. The focus is on the price limit as the frictions of search are removed. It is found that a necessary and sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933293
We study slow Dutch auctions, where the clock does not fall instantaneously, but instead falls over time. Buyers are assumed less patient than the seller. In a symmetric setting, we investigate the properties of the optimal revenue-maximizing clock. We find that the clock is genuinely dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011151147
Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and, each unit of time, continuums of new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332593
We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. A friction parameter is [tau], the length of the time period until the next meeting. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008507143