We introduce call externalities in the standard model of network competition with termination-based price discrimination under a CPP regime, and employ a simple graphical analysis to study the outcome of competition. In contrast to recent results in the literature we find that even under linear...

We present a generalized model of myopic best response adaptation in large populations. In asymmetric conflicts, individuals can be in the role of the row player or the column player. The idea that an individual's role need not be fixed is introduced explicitly in our model by a process of role...

We introduce call externalities in the standard model of network competition with termination-based price discrimination under a CPP regime, and employ a simple graphical analysis to study the outcome of competition. In contrast to recent results in the literature we find that even under linear...

Cooperating in the Prisoner's Dilemma is irrational and some supporting mechanism is needed to stabilize cooperation. Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is one such mechanism. Assessing an individual's reputation requires first-order information, i.e. knowledge about its previous behavior,...