In the one-shot trust or investment game without opportunities for reputation formation or contracting, economic theory predicts no trusting because there is no incentive for trustworthiness. Under these conditions, theory predicts (a) no effect of pre-play communication, and (b) universal...

Human beings display a complex set of behavioural predispositions, including a strong inclination to pursue self-interest but also empathy, receptivity to norms of reciprocity, and an inclination to punish violators of such norms. Not only are workable economic arrangements constrained by the...

We conduct trust game experiments in which subjects can sometimes exchange proposals either in numerical (tabular) form, or using chat messages followed by exchange of numerical proposals. Numerical communication significantly increases trusting and trustworthiness; inclusion of 1-min verbal...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the mechanisms by which decisions about others are affected by the information known about them. The authors argue that the availability of information about deep-level attributes diminishes the role of surface-level attributes in how people...

Abstract The ownership and governance of for-profit (FP), nonprofit (NP), and local government (LG) organizations are different. Therefore, the objectives of these different types of organizations and their performance may differ. We conjecture that in markets where there is substantial...