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A number of economists have supported the taxation of speculation in financial markets. We examine the welfare economics of such a tax in a model of a financial market where some agents have superior information and others have a hedging motive. We show that a tax on speculators may actually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005728234
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In this paper we provide a characterization of the welfare properties of rational expectations equilibria of economies in which, prior to trading, agents have some information over the realization of uncertainty. We study a model with asymmetrically informed agents, treating symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009439639
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We study an equilibrium model with restricted investor participation in which strategic arbitrageurs reap profits by exploiting mispricings across different market segments. We endogenize the asset structure as the outcome of a security design game played by the arbitrageurs. The equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005024386
We analyse an equilibrium model with restricted investor participation in which strategic arbitrageurs play an innovation game and exploit the resulting mispricings by reaping trading profits. Since the equilibrium asset structure is not chosen by a social planner, it is chosen to maximize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791699
In this paper we provide a characterization of the welfare properties of rational expectations equilibria of economies in which, prior to trading, agents have some information over the realization of uncertainty. We study a model with asymmetrically informed agents, treating symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136439
This paper studies the problem of optimal security design by a privately informed entrepreneur. In the context of a simple parametric model, it is shown that the entrepreneur does not find it profitable to float an asset that affords her an informational advantage. The reason is that, with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005242897
At a competitive equilibrium of an incomplete-markets economy agents’ marginal valuations for the tradable assets are equalized ex-ante. We characterize the finest partition of the state space conditional on which this equality holds for any economy. This leads naturally to a necessary and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010698235
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