We study an equilibrium model with restricted investor participation in which strategic arbitrageurs reap profits by exploiting mispricings across different market segments. We endogenize the asset structure as the outcome of a security design game played by the arbitrageurs. The equilibrium...

We analyse an equilibrium model with restricted investor participation in which strategic arbitrageurs play an innovation game and exploit the resulting mispricings by reaping trading profits. Since the equilibrium asset structure is not chosen by a social planner, it is chosen to maximize...

We study a simple rational expectations (RE) model whose asset pricing implications address some of the short-run mispricings, informational inefficiencies, and overreactions observed in real markets, without a need to resort to behavioral assumptions. We accomplish this by relying on the...

Extreme events in financial markets are often generated by shocks that come from within the system, rather than those that arrive from outside the system. The combination of risk-sensitive behavior rules and the coordinated actions implied by market-to-market accounting can result in outcome...