We discuss the emerging field of New Classical economics from the perspective of some classical economic questions regarding the generation of wealth. We limit our discussion to the foundations of the emerging field and do not provide a complete overview of the details of the literature. We...

In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation, can be used as the foundation of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our approach sheds light on the...

This paper develops several versions of a concept of rational expectations Lindahl equilibrium for economies with private and public goods and linear production, and proves the generic existence of fully revealing rational expectations Lindahl equilibria using only the prices of the private...

We model an economy with social institutions that facilitate trade and induce three types of costs: establishment costs, access costs, and use costs. Use costs are specific transaction costs related to the use of these trade institutions. We assume that a trade institution is economically...