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This paper discusses the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791951
Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791765
The literature on within-firm organizational change and productivity suggests that firms can make more efficient use of certain technologies if complementary forms of organization are adopted. This issue may be of even greater importance for the case of greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement...
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We revisit job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities from a different perspective, extending Schmitz (2013a). When two sequential tasks need to be performed by wealth-constrained agents, the principal can hire only one agent or two different agents. When there exists an outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076558
A principal wants two sequential tasks to be performed by wealth-constrained agents. Suppose that there is an outcome externality; i.e., a first-stage success can make second-stage effort more or less effective. If the tasks are conflicting, the principal's profit-maximizing way to induce high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608231
The effects of the quality of institutions on economic development and comparative advantage have been so far investigated separately. This paper proposes a theoretical framework in which trade patterns and growth rates are jointly determined by international differences in contract enforcement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498068
We develop a property-rights model of the firm in which production entails a continuum of uniquely sequenced stages. In each stage, a final-good producer contracts with a distinct supplier for the procurement of a customized stage-specific component. Our model yields a sharp characterization for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133513