In their analysis of strategic information transmission, Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel (1982) showed the existence of partition equilibria (Theorem 1). Although the theorem itself is correct, the proof contains some incorrect statements. We present a counter‐example and provide a correct...

This paper provides a way to formulate a general equilibrium model with both infinite time horizon and continuous uncertainty by 2.space, and provides a si mple proof of the equiva-lence of equilibria in complete markets, inc omplete markets with sequential trading, and incomplete markets with...

The present paper extends the Folk theorem in repeated games to the situation where agents change their partners over time. Cooperation is sustained because defection against one agent causes sanction by others, and the paper shows how such a "social norm" is sustained by self-interested agents....

The present paper tries to explain cooperative behavior in an organization run by a sequence of long- but finitely-lived agents. The author shows that the Folk theorem holds for infinitely repeated games with overlapping generations of finitely-lived players; any mutually beneficial outcome can...

An evolutionary model with a finite number of players and with stochastic mutations is analyzed. The expansion and contraction of strategies is linked to their current relative success, but mutuation, perturbing the system from its deterministic evolution, are present as well. The focus is on...

We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. The processes are affected by persistent random shocks stemming from agents' maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term--logit...

Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imperfect monitoring has focused on public strategies: strategies that depend solely on the history of publicly observable signals. This paper sheds light on the role of private strategies: strategies that depend not only on public...