This paper clarifies an issue in the Hirshleifer and Rasmusen-Tsebelis controversy on the effects of penalties on crime: what is the effect of penalties if the transgression of law has a discrete nature and if the law enforcer cannot act as Stackelberg leader? We differentiate between technical...

We consider an inspection game between polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency that can inspect ambient pollution before inspecting individual firms. We assume that the enforcement agency's objectives do not perfectly correspond with the objectives of the legislative body who...

We consider an inspection game between n polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and mixing between observing ambient pollution and not...

Concerns about the environmental effects of procurement decisions are gaining momentum. We investigate how the environmental quality of public purchases changes under two possible institutional settings: a centralized one, where a single regulator is in charge of both production efficiency and...

The current waste crisis in Italy is the most recent evidence that criminal organisations can impact waste management heavily. Nonetheless, this aspect has been neglected by current literature. We take the first step in filling this gap by developing a model which allows for the presence of a...