Showing 1 - 10 of 42
This paper studies optimal labour market policy in a society where differently gifted individuals can invest in training to further increase their labour market productivity and where the government seeks both efficiency and equity. Frictions in the matching process create unemployment and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065317
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015390265
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011756990
Abstract We compare equilibrium allocations in directed search models where prices are determined alternatively by posting and by competing auctions, with the following results. With finite numbers of players, sellers' expected payoffs are higher when all sellers auction than when all sellers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014588341
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012088473
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005499410
We study the assignment of agents to clubs in a frictional market environment. Club entry is endogenous and clubs compete by posting reserve prices in a competing auctions game prior to the agents’ decisions regarding which club to visit. The competing auctions equilibrium is constrained...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116214
We present a competing-auction theory of the labor market, where job candidates auction their labor services to employers. An equilibrium matching function emerges which has many of the features commonly assumed, including constant returns to scale in large economies. The auction mechanism also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085581
We compare equilibrium allocations in directed search models where prices are determined alternatively by posting and by competing auctions, with the following results. With finite numbers of players, sellers' expected payoffs are higher when all sellers auction than when all sellers post. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086969
We analyze monetary exchange in a model that allows for directed search and multilateral matches. We consider environments with divisible goods and indivisible money, and compare the results with those in models that use random matching and bilateral bargaining. Two different pricing mechanisms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005058497