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We consider discounted repeated games in which players can voluntarily purchase information about the opponents' actions at past stages. Information about a stage can be bought at a fixed but arbitrary cost. Opponents cannot observe the information purchase by a player. For our main result, we...
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We consider a game Gn played by two players. There are n independent random variables Z1, ... , Zn, each of which is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Both players know n, the independence and the distribution of these random variables, but only player 1 knows the vector of realizations...
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From Decision Theory to Game Theory shows how the reasoning patterns of common belief in rationality, correct beliefs and symmetric beliefs can be defined in a unified way. It explores the link between decision theory and game theory, particularly how various important classes of games (e.g.,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015426233
Simon and Stinchcombe distinguish two approaches to perfect equilibrium, the “trembling hand” approach, and the “finitistic” approach, for games with compact action spaces and continuous payoffs. We investigate relations between the different types of perfect equilibrium introduced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049681
We study a framework where two duopolists compete repeatedly in prices and where chosen prices potentially affect future market shares, but certainly do not affect current sales. This assumption of consumer inertia causes (noncooperative) coordination on high prices only to be possible as an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065469
We extend the notion of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (Nature 246:15–18, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">1973</CitationRef>) for models ruled by a single fitness matrix A, to the framework of stochastic games developed by Lloyd Shapley (Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 39:1095–1100, <CitationRef CitationID="CR13">1953</CitationRef>) where, at...</citationref></citationref>
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Every finite extensive-form game with perfect information has a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this note we settle to the negative an open problem regarding the existence of a subgame-perfect <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\varepsilon $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi mathvariant="italic">ε</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon and Borel...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>
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