An open macroeconomic model where wages and employment are determinedby bargaining between a representative firm and a representative union is developed. The model is characterized by a number of regimes; in each of these regimes the effects of changes in the termsof trade and in government...

In fixed-time electoral economies, partisan surprises are associated with a change in government as in Alberto Alesina (1987). This paper models additional partisan surprises present in variable-electoral-term economies due to the timing of the change in government. Two versions of the model are...

Many economic environments exhibit payoff discontinuity and indeterminacy, particularly those involving factors that are not under the deliberate control of players, such as prejudicial bias and trust. Simon and Zame (1990) introduce the concept of sharing rules as a means for endogenously...

In context of the traditional Spence signaling model, the realization of a separating equilibrium ensures that each worker is allocated to the sector of the economy where they are most productive. Traditional analysis assumes, however, that the incremental returns to labor employment are...