The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, there is no second-order punishment for those countries that fail to...

After the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the extension of national quotas in the Bonn and Marrakesh agreements, meagre environmental effects and a low price of emission permits are likely to be the outcome of implementation. This paper attempts to analyze this scenario, mainly in...

The paper presents an adjusted Faustmann Rule for optimal harvest of a forest when there is a social cost of carbon emissions. The theoretical framework takes account of the dynamics and interactions of forests’ multiple carbon pools and assumes an infinite time horizon. Our paper provides a...

This timely Handbook reviews many key issues in the economics of energy and climate change, raising new questions and offering solutions that might help to minimize the threat of energy-induced climate change.

Using a non-cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.