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Specific Knowledge and Performance Measurement

Raith, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper examines optimal incentives and performance measurement in a setting where an agent has specific knowledge … choice of performance measures and incentives depends on the agent’s knowledge, environmental risk, technological uncertainty …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504471

Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory

Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

, the model offers an explanation for motivational crowding out: Control systems and pecuniary incentives may erode morale …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662241

Resource Allocation and Firm Scope

Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … division managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666612

Joint Production in Teams

Battaglini, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791765

Life-Cycle Wage Growth and Heterogeneous Human Capital

Sanders, Carl; Taber, Christopher - In: Annual Review of Economics 4 (2012) 1, pp. 399-425

Wages grow rapidly for young workers, and the human capital investment model is the classic framework to explain this growth. While estimation and the theory of human capital have traditionally focused on general human capital, both have evolved toward models of heterogeneous human capital. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604270

Formal versus Informal Monitoring in Teams

Gershkov, Alex; Winter, Eyal - In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7 (2015) 2, pp. 27-44

In this paper we analyze a principal's optimal monitoring strategies in a team environment. In doing so we study the interaction between formal monitoring and informal (peer) monitoring. We show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, peer monitoring substitutes for the principal's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011267821

Pandering to Persuade

Che, Yeon-Koo; Dessein, Wouter; Kartik, Navin - In: American Economic Review 103 (2013) 1, pp. 47-79

An agent advises a principal on selecting one of multiple projects or an outside option. The agent is privately informed about the projects' benefits and shares the principal's preferences except for not internalizing her value from the outside option. We show that for moderate outside option...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815518

Are you a good employee or simply a good guy? Influence costs and contract design

Corgnet, Brice; Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 92 (2013) C, pp. 259-272

leads to low-powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result. Interestingly … deter manipulation and lead to high-powered incentives. This result implies that the optimal contract (and whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737917

Field-of-use restrictions in licensing agreements

Schuett, Florian - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 30 (2012) 5, pp. 403-416

A widely used clause in license contracts – the field-of-use restriction (FOUR) – precludes licensees from operating outside of the technical field specified. When a technology has several distinct applications, FOUR allow the licensor to divide up his rights and attribute them to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051661

A Theory of the Firm based on Partner Displacement

Hellmann, Thomas; Thiele, Veikko - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012

incentives for specific investments, and that wealthy owners actually want to commit to ex-post wealth constraints. Our analysis …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950631