Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to study the effect that weak enforceability of property rights has on the human resource practices of firms operating in hostile business environment. Design/methodology/approach – This paper questions the role of the state as the only provider of...

The common assumptions that labor income share does not change over time or across countries and that factor income shares are equal to the elasticity of output with respect to factors have had important implications for economic theory. However, there are several theoretical reasons for why the...

In this study, we propose an explanation for why labor and capital shares do not seem to have a trend: an increasing trend in physical capital share is compensated by a decreasing trend in land share. Similarly, an increasing trend in human capital share is compensated by a decreasing trend in...

We model conflict between two agents in which each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or rejection of the truce. We use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game in which each agent commits to transfer a share of its output to the other agent (Sertel, 1991)....

This note presents a simple extension of the seminal Romer (1990, Journal of Political Economy 98(2), 71â102) paper. Allowing for elasticity of substitution between labor and capital to be different from one (CES production function instead of CobbâDouglas), the following results are obtained....

We present an endogenous growth model where innovations are factor saving. Technologies can be changed paying a cost and technological change takes place only if the benefits are larger than the costs. Since the gains derived from factor saving innovations depend on factor abundance, biased...

We explain why economic conflicts and illegal business often take place in poor countries. We use the concept of subsistence level of consumption (d) and assume a regular concave utility function for consumption levels higher than d. For consumption levels lower than d utility is constant and...