We consider a finite two-player zero-sum game with vector-valued rewards. We study the question of whether a given polyhedral set D is "approachable," that is, whether Player 1 (the "decision maker") can guarantee that the long-term average reward belongs to D, for any strategy of Player 2 (the...

We consider a finite-state, finite-action, infinite-horizon, discounted reward Markov decision process and study the bias and variance in the value function estimates that result from empirical estimates of the model parameters. We provide closed-form approximations for the bias and variance,...

Regret minimization in repeated matrix games has been extensively studied ever since Hannan's seminal paper [Hannan, J., 1957. Approximation to Bayes risk in repeated play. In: Dresher, M., Tucker, A.W., Wolfe, P. (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. III. Ann. of Math. Stud., vol....

We consider a Cournot oligopoly model where multiple suppliers (oligopolists) compete by choosing quantities. We compare the social welfare achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, for the case where the inverse market demand function is convex. We establish a lower bound on...

We show that when a one-supplier/one-newsvendor supply chain is capacity-constrained, wholesale price contracts have some flexibility in allocating the channel-optimal profit. We analyze how this flexibility changes as we change the supply chain׳s capacity constraint and market demand. We also...

A problem that often arises in the process of searching for a job or for a candidate to fill a position is that applicants do not know if they will receive an offer from any given firm with which they interview, and, conversely, firms do not know whether applicants will definitely take positions...