We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient types produce the same quantity irrespective of their...

orldwide, postal and delivery economics has attracted considerable interest. Numerous questions have arisen, including the role of regulation, funding the Universal Service Obligation, postal reform in Europe, Asia and North America, the future of national postal operators, demand and pricing...

This paper examines the agency cost of winner-picking in multidivision firms and uses explicit incentive contracts to analyze the interaction between corporate headquarters´ investment and incentive policies. Winner-picking, i.e., the efficient reallocation of scarce resources in an internal...

orldwide, postal and delivery economics has attracted considerable interest. Numerous questions have arisen, including the role of regulation, funding the Universal Service Obligation, postal reform in Europe, Asia and North America, the future of national postal operators, demand and pricing...