We offer a new proof that the equilibrium manifold (under complete markets) identifies individual demands globally. Moreover, under observation of only a subset of the equilibrium manifold, we find domains on which aggregate and individual demands are identifiable. Our argument avoids the...

Empirical tests of the Nash bargaining solution (NBS, hereafter) are developed under different hypotheses about the behavior of disagreement utility levels.

<Para ID="Par1">We develop revealed preference tests for models of multi-product oligopoly, building on the work in Carvajal et al. (Econometrica 81(6):2351–2379, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">2013</CitationRef>). We analyze a Cournot model with multiple goods and show that it has testable restrictions when at least one good is produced by two or more...</citationref></para>

Foster (1999) has given a proof of the Calibration Theorem of Foster and Vohra (1998), using the Approachability Theorem proposed by Blackwell (1956). This note presents a simplified version of Foster's argument, invoking the specialization given by Greenwald et al. (2006) of Blackwell's Theorem.

There is a collection of exogenously given socially feasible sets, and, for each one of them, each individual in a group chooses from an individually feasible set. The fact that the product of the individually feasible sets is larger than the socially feasible set notwithstanding, there arises...

In economies subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained inefficient: reallocations of assets support Pareto superior allocations. This is the case even if the asset market for the allocation of aggregate risks is complete.