That governments should delegate the operation of monetary policy to independent central banks is widely advocated. For a closed economy, the optimal choice results in a banker who is more conservative than the representative government, assigning a lower weight on output in her welfare...

We consider Sims's (2008) argument that robust policy making requires that policy models be treated as “probability models”. In a welfare-based setting, we estimate by Bayesian methods a number of variants of a New Keynesian macroeconomic model and use both the model odds and posterior...

This comprehensive Handbook presents the current state of art in the theory and methodology of macroeconomic data analysis. It is intended as a reference for graduate students and researchers interested in exploring new methodologies, but can also be employed as a graduate text. The Handbook...

This comprehensive Handbook presents the current state of art in the theory and methodology of macroeconomic data analysis. It is intended as a reference for graduate students and researchers interested in exploring new methodologies, but can also be employed as a graduate text. The Handbook...

This article studies the open-economy Rogoff delegation game, taking into account both intra-country and intercountry interactions between fiscal authorities and central banks. With representative bankers, the Nash equilibrium of fiscal and monetary authorities independently responding to...

This paper revisits a widely adopted approach to robust decision making developed by (Hansen and Sargent, 2003) and (Hansen and Sargent, 2008)--henceforth HS--and applies it to monetary policy design in the face of model uncertainty. We pay particular attention to two issues: first, we...