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In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847557
In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999608
This paper deals with bankruptcy problems in which the players have different utility functions defined in terms of the quantity of allocated resources. We tackle this kind of situation by means of a game without transferable utility and provide two characterizations of the CEA-rule in this...
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This paper deals with bankruptcy problems in which the players have different utility functions defined in terms of the quantity of allocated resources. We tackle this kind of situation by means of a game without transferable utility and provide two characterizations of the CEA-rule in this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010759217
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