In a simple macromodel with forward-looking expectations, this Paper looks into disclosure policy when a central bank has private information on future shocks. The main result is that advance disclosure of forecasts of future shocks does not improve welfare, and in some cases is not desirable as...

The paper examines the effect of trend productivity growth on the determinacy and learnability of equilibria under alternative monetary policy rules. Under zero trend inflation we show that the economic structure is isomorphic to that of Bullard and Mitra (2002) and show that under a policy rule...

Central banks around the world have a reputation for being secretive about their operations and market assessments. It is sometimes argued that central banks need flexibility and therefore cannot be fully transparent. We find that this explanation does not carry through in a forward-looking New...

In this paper we incorporate the term structure of interest rates in a standard inflation forecast targeting framework. We find that under flexible inflation targeting and uncertainty in the degree of persistence in the economy, allowing for active learning possibilities has effects on the...

Some central banks have a reputation for being secretive. A justification for this behaviour that we find in the literature is that being transparent about operations and beliefs hinders the central bank in achieving the best outcome. In other words, a central bank needs flexibility and...

The paper analyzes the effects of government spending shocks under alternative rates of trend growth in a New-Keynesian model characterized by price and wage rigidity. We show that the presence of trend growth makes the impact on output and consumption of government spending shocks smaller but...